The Internet is no more an expansion of the human mind than the vacuum cleaner is an expansion of the human lung.
Hallucinations
Aside
“Wall-E”, Four Years Later
Praise for the 2008 animated film Wall-E was loud and unanimous. Called a cautionary tale for our times, a masterpiece of animation, and even an anti-capitalist fable, it also managed to captivate audiences of all ages with its main character, the eponymous little robot whose innocence and romantic sensibilities made him a kind of postmodern Chaplin.
Not surprisingly, the adjective that came up most often in reviews was “charming,” one of those words—like “glamour” and “fascination”—whose contemporary usage has come to overshadow older, more ominous meanings. In addition to signifying, “to please and delight,” charm also means “to bewitch, to control by means of magic spells, to seduce for the purposes of manipulation.” Buyer beware. If a Wall Street broker were to tell you that he read Marx’s Capital and loved every word, you could reasonably assume that, a) this person did not read it closely enough, or b) this person was trying to put one over you. It does not behoove corporations like Disney or Pixar to attack the foundations of their economic (not to say political) power. The last thing Disney-Pixar expected from their anti-consumerist fairy tale was that the world would somehow change as a result of it. The line of merchandise that followed in the film’s wake made this amply clear.
[Spoilers ahead] There is only one corporation in Wall-E: Buy-N-Large. In addition to producing every conceivable good and service humans might need, Buy-N-Large also handles all manners of social management. Totalitarian to a degree that would put Mussolini to shame, the civilization of Wall-E boils down to three neat orders: there is the Regime that produces commodities, the Consumers who consume them, and the Robot-Slaves—that is, the commodities themselves.
You would think a totalitarian government of this magnitude would be the villain of the piece. But think again: Buy-N-Large is not evil, it is not even selfish. The movie portrays the corporation not as humanity’s exploiter, but rather as its benevolent guardian. If it produced the trash that now litters the planet, it is only because it had to live up to its humanitarian ideal of responding to the demand. Now that the demand has resulted in a world of shit, it has selflessly taken up the task—free of charge—of constructing robots to clean up the mess while offering humans a relaxing, all-expenses-paid space vacation in the meantime. Disney, the PR department of hyper-capitalism, is sending us a message: “We feel awful about shoving this junk down your throats, filling your minds with garbage and systematically destroying the planet, but what can we do? We only aim to please.”
Wall-E, like the corporate sector whose interests it represents, places the blame for the world’s ills squarely on the shoulders of the consumer. If there is little fair trade coffee at the supermarket, it is because consumers aren’t willing to pay extra for it. If there are no electric cars, it is because consumers have demonstrated their unshakable allegiance to fossil fuels. As a “moral entity,” the corporation has only one purpose: to heroically and selflessly provide what people want.
As it turns out, Buy-N-Large never does clean up the earth in the film. The damage was too serious, and in the last act it falls upon the people to clean up its own mess. The humans who return to earth at the end of the film are not the people who run Buy-N-Large, but the consumers, the servants of the system. They will have to do the cleaning, because in the end it’s only fair that those who committed the sin be the ones who do penance for it. No moral can be delivered effectively without an element of guilt, and here Wall-E reveals itself as a monstrous guilt trip laid on audiences who, as the good conscientious liberals they are, swallowed it whole.
A lie as big as Wall-E cannot help but betray a measure of truth. Some critics detected a hint of condescension in the film’s portrayal of American consumers as fat, stupid, and generally useless slobs. Against this accusation, the filmmakers insisted that humans in the film are depicted as obese only because obesity would in fact be one the long-term effects of living in weightlessness. But if they really were such sticklers for scientific accuracy, why then are people in the film not seen floating in the ship’s zero-G environment? And why can we hear Wall-E’s bells and whistles in the soundless vacuum of space?
Let’s not kid ourselves: Wall-E gives us a pretty good picture of how humans appear to corporate eyes. They are soft and compliant. They will do whatever you tell them to do and believe whatever you say. They are not adults, not individuals—they are babies. In a world filled with such people, democracy can at best serve as a masquerade, a parlor game to keep the children entertained while the grown-ups do the real work of manning the machine. Isn’t it significant that the elites in Wall-E—seen only on video screens—are played by live actors, while the general populace consists of a mass of cartoon characters who would be indistinguishable from one another if it weren’t for the odd variation in skin tone?
In spite of all this, fans of the film could insist that Wall-E remains a cautionary tale about the potential dangers of continued mass consumption. If things keep going the way they are, they might say, the world will look like the devastated landscape in the first act of the film, regardless of the latter’s ideological problems. If the film had come out in 1968, this argument might have had held some water. But the truth of the matter is right there, in the opening shots. Look at the garbage that litters the ruined city and the shelves in the robot’s home. This isn’t garbage from the future; it isn’t even garbage from today—it is yesterday’s garbage, the ruins of History. Wall-E does not take place in some hypothetical future but in the present, in the wasteland that the hyperreality of virtual existence allows us to ignore. The robot is not wandering in the wreck of our tomorrows but in the slums of the real. Analogously, the plebes in the space ship are not adrift in outer space, but in cyberspace, in the fantasia of Western self-delusion. Perhaps this is slightly more obvious now, in 2012, than it was when the film came out, since the winds of change have blown the wasteland back into our neck of the woods.
Thoughts on Watching “Blade Runner”
The Turing Test was conceived in 1950 as a way to determine if a thinking machine is in fact conscious. The test—which a computer has yet to pass as far as I know—runs as follows: a human subject engages in a conversation with two computers. One of the computers generates its own replies while the other gives answers typed out by a hidden human participant. If, after the test, the subject cannot tell which computer was human-operated and which wasn’t, then we must conclude that the self-operating machine is conscious. The argument is that the machine would then have given the subject the same evidence for consciousness as any being of flesh and blood.
The potential implications of this philosophical move are worth pondering. For even as a successful thinking machine would “become” conscious by passing the test, the subject—the human being—would by the same logic become something more like a machine. The line between a living organism and a dead mechanism would vanish. These serious implications were on Philip K. Dick’s mind when he wrote: “…within the universe exist fierce cold things, which I have given the name ‘machines’ to. Their behavior frightens me, especially when it imitates human behavior so well that I get the uncomfortable sense that these things are trying to pass themselves off as human but are not.”
In Blade Runner, Ridley Scott’s adaptation of Dick’s novel Do Androids Dream of Electric Sheep?, we are presented with the Voigt-Kampff test, which is very similar to the Turing Test, only now the purpose is inverted: it aims to determine if a seemingly human being is actually a machine. The Voigt-Kampff test is conducted by blade runners, humans specialized in tracking down and destroying illegal androids, or “replicants.” Early in the film, the blade runner Deckard (Harrison Ford) conducts the test on a woman, Rachael (Sean Young), who turns out to be a replicant, unbeknownst to herself. Later on, Rachael asks Deckard if he has ever taken the test himself. The question is never answered but the seeds of doubt are sewn. In the end the viewer is left wondering whether or not Deckard is human. Cue the endless stream of essays.
Watching the film today, it is impressive how accurate its image of the future has turned out to be. Although we still lack hovercars and off-world colonies, we do have rampant corporatism, global information systems, genetically modified food, synthetic DNA, and nanotechnology (not to mention a breakdown of the social order). And so far as the replicants are concerned, maybe the prophecy wasn’t so much that we would actually create androids one day, but that our particular belief system was turning us into androids. In other words, the question really isn’t whether machines are becoming more like us, but whether we, by enshrouding ourselves in technological artifice, are becoming more machine-like.
Reading up on neurology and cognitive psychology can sometimes be a very Kafkaesque experience today. There you are, a sentient being—a self as far as you can tell—reading the words of a writer with enough self-regard to have their name printed on the cover of their book and to make occasional use of the first person to keep things cordial, telling you that “you” don’t exist. Your sense of self is a mirage, a riddle that science is on the verge of solving. The difference between living things and non-living things is quantitative, not qualitative. The only thing separating us from rocks, trees, viruses, and iPads is complexity. The “person” is an illusion. The decree has been issued even before a machine passes the Turing Test (almost as if to create the preconditions for the Test’s validity). Consciousness is a wobbly mirage hovering over the hot mass of the brain. The people you meet on the street are not persons at all, but genetic constructs pretending to be persons, i.e., androids or replicants.
In Dick’s prophetic worldview, androids are by nature incapable of empathy. They are motivated solely by self-interest. Here too, they resemble science’s (or, to be fair, scientism‘s) picture of human beings. By making the absence of transcendental moral truth axiomatic, scientism makes it impossible to imagine a world where ethics is anything more than clever self-interest. If the soul is a mirage, then empathy must be just as delusional. The fact that these ideas may be correct hardly makes them more comforting. Culture has become a deception, an obstacle to absolute knowledge, and a hurdle on the path of total control.
It could be argued that there are is no empathy at all in the world of Blade Runner, that no one would pass the Voigt-Kampff test because all have been reduced to the level of a machine. Indeed, the horrific setting suggests an age where love has fled. Likewise, the case could be made that there are no actual replicants in the film; that replicants are composed of the same vague substance as the contemporary “terrorist” or “illegal alien.” In this interpretation, the “replicant problem” is a necessary illusion which the ruling oligarchs have spun to ensure social cohesion and compliance. But even without going to such interpretive extremes, the central intuition of the film remains the same. By forcing us to ponder the mystery of Deckard’s true nature, Blade Runner is putting another, more urgent question, to each of us: “Are you, the viewer, a replicant?”
Blade Runner shows us what a world that fully espouses the reductive vision of the human would look like. Sadly, our world resembles it more and more every day. The only hope the film (not the book) offers lies in the fact that replicants do have empathy after all. We see it in the Roy Batty’s death scene and in Deckard’s love for Rachael. In this gesture, the film suggests that the mystery of personhood and humanity isn’t a question for science but for individuals. Humanity is not a given: it must be chosen, it must be achieved over and against the machinery of blind drives. The human is not a given but a possibility to be seized or rejected. The choice is between living as a moral creature that dares to love, or succumbing to biology and ideology to become another mechanical doll.
On owning a Rothko
Aside
Theory. The ultra rich and powerful collect original works of art to avoid looking at them by reducing them to harmless commodities. Who but the blind (or the already mad) would want to hang a Rothko in their dining room? A Rothko is like a portal to the underworld (don’t be fooled by the pretty-coloured ones). Every time a Rothko painting is sold for 30+ million dollars, there’s a cackle in hell as the dead painter delights in soon having one more companion.
Nature and/or Grace
Arguing over semantics is usually the sign that a friendly debate has deteriorated into a lame exchange of opinions. To avoid getting offensive, the parties agree that, at the end of the day, they just have different ways of saying the same thing… precisely because they aren’t saying the same thing at all.
The liberal mind has a pathological aversion to conflict. Liberalism has always been a tradition of compromise, aiming to politely represent the interests of the oppressed without ever letting the word “oppression” slip out. Urban intellectuals, bohemians, latter-day hipsters and the rest of our ilk have for the most part inherited this allergy. We run in circles where, in practice, offending someone at a dinner party boils down to a worse injustice than the corporate sanction of child slavery, the mention of which so rudely sidetracked the chat about the virtues of the iPad.
So it’s with some hesitation that I want to talk semantics here. But there’s a word that keeps cropping up that I think needs some scrutiny. That word is “evolution.”
It’s a word that’s used in different ways. There’s its obvious application in science to mean the development of species through natural selection. There’s its use to connote any organic development from the simple to the complex. There is also “evolution of consciousness” in the sense of the growth of ideas through time, and the phrase “conscious evolution,” which is used in the consciousness movement for what I perceive to be the exact opposite of evolution in the usual sense. My concern isn’t with these applications but with the use of this word, evolution, to give certain metaphysical theories a scientific lacquer which not only cheapens them, but actually makes them dangerous.
It occurred to me to write about this as I read Ken Wilber’s Up from Eden: A Transpersonal View of Human Evolution. (I should state from the outset that I’m not a fan of Ken Wilber, or of any other writer who has every possible human experience neatly pegged in a totalizing system.) In these pages, Wilber pushes a notion of evolution that unites the formation of the physical universe, natural selection and historical progress in a single process. Those who deny that consciousness is subject to this process he dismisses as “retro-Romantics,” far behind the times:
The retro-Romantics and neopagans fully agreed that evolution operated in the rest of the universe but not in humans; in fact, the Romantics added, in the case of humans, evolution started running backward! In the general Romantic view, humans, both phylogenetically and ontogenetically, started out in a type or primal Eden, a great paradise, an original heaven on earth, and then things promptly started going downhill from there. The massive forces operating in the Kosmos for billions and billions of years — forces that produced ants from atoms and apes from amoebas, colossal forces that propelled galaxies and quasars into planetary configurations, and from there into cells with sensations, and organisms with perceptions, and animals that could see and feel and think — all of those forces, once humans were produced, simply came to an abrupt and crashing halt — they simply stopped working! — and for no other apparent reason than that they didn’t fit with the retro-Romantics’ idea of the way the world should run. (Forward to the 1996 edition, p. 296 in vol. 2 of the Collected Works)
The “colossal forces” that Wilber’s talking about have nothing to do with evolution: they are the laws of physics. Unless we’re speaking in metaphors, plasma doesn’t evolve by becoming a star any more than a rock evolves by rolling down a hill. Moreover, if physical forces produce order and form in the universe, they also produce disorder and chaos. The forces that set the stage for our leap from apes to people are the same that could very well slam a giant asteroid into the earth and do away with us altogether. To equate them with human evolution, let alone moral progress, is a category mistake. Though indirectly, Wilber is here presupposing a moral dimension in nature. His version of evolution has nothing to do with The Origin of Species or the actual formation of stars; it has everything to do with the doctrine of historical progress set in a sharply pantheist key.
For Wilber and most other neo-gnostic thinkers, evolution is the name given to the idea that the world is “intended,” whereas for scientists, evolution proves that the cosmos has no intrinsic moral order, no intentionality. As the philosopher John Gray puts it, “A truly naturalist worldview leaves no room for secular hope.” Scientifically speaking, you can’t use Darwinism to develop a theory of progress anymore than you can use the assembly instructions of a computer to perform brain surgery. Of course, the cultural appropriation of the idea of evolution—its conflation with the idea of progress—goes back to Darwin’s earliest disciples. It’s built right into the Victorian vision of “higher” and “lower” life forms and their racial analogues in the human species. If social Darwinism gets such a beating from Wilber in his book, it’s mainly because Wilber himself is trying to wrest Darwinism from conservatives like Herbert Spencer. He wants to hammer out a fresher, friendlier, more liberal form of social Darwinism under the flag of integral theory.
And so Wilber writes that there exist clearly definable stages which a person must go through in the evolutionary process. A person’s color-coded stage determines how she thinks and feels about the world. Thus there are Beige people, Purple people and Red people, and onward to Yellow (Wilber’s own “integral” stage) and the enigmatic Turquoise, which no one knows much about because it’s still only emerging. For those who are put off by the apparent hierarchical nature of this system, Wilber points out that the stages aren’t stacked one atop the other (that would be very Red of him) but arranged in a circle, where each stage “integrates” and “transcends” the ones preceding it. If claiming that my stage is only higher in the sense that it includes and transcends yours isn’t the epitome of egotism (which, incidentally, is an attribute of the least integral stages in the rainbow wheel), I don’t know what is.
In the video of a talk at the Integral Institute, one of Wilber’s disciples addresses Thomas Keating and David Steindl-Rast, both Roman Catholic monks, as follows: “This might be a politically incorrect question, but are either of you aware of anybody in the college of cardinals who has a centre of gravity that could lead the church into orange and green?”
In plain English, he’s asking if there are any progressive cardinals in Rome who could make the Church more inclusive, more accepting of difference, more tolerant—i.e., more liberal. A great idea no doubt, but you see the implication. The question conceals a belief that people with a progressive worldview are not only right, they’re actually more evolved. The superiority of liberalism stems not from the power of its arguments but from nature itself. The cardinals in Rome never consciously chose their worldview; they just haven’t yet been “led” to the evolutionary stage where they will see the light. Perhaps all we need to do is mail the pope a copy of Wilber’s Brief History of Everything, or at the very least the latest book by the arguably Yellow-stage Deepak Chopra, to get the evolutionary machine grinding in Vatican City and turn the Roman Catholic Church into the Esalen Institute.
The fact that the questioner started off by confessing his political incorrectness is interesting, since political incorrectness is often synonymous with saying the thing that’s on everyone’s mind but that no one dares to say. There’s a tacit agreement in educated circles that the root cause of the bigotry of conservatives, rural hicks, neocons and Tea Party members is their incapacity to perceive reality because their consciousness isn’t evolved enough to do so.
That’s my beef with all this talk about the evolution of consciousness. It’s one thing to believe in ethical development and the virtues of tolerance, which I think are as important now as it ever was. It’s quite another to attribute these things to unstoppable forces of nature which have the peculiar tendency to favour white educated liberals. And it’s another thing again to think that history can be reduced to a linear ascension from primordial jelly to celestial being.
Wilber himself says that evolution is irreversible. Sure enough, it’s impossible to imagine a particular Homo sapiens turning back the clock to physically return to the Homo erectus stage. On the other hand, we can all too easily imagine a confirmed Yellow turning into a raging Red under the right circumstance—say, poverty or starvation or physical threat. In other words, while the genome changes through a verifiable chain of cause and effect, every step forward in moral development is completely contingent. Maybe there’s wisdom to the Buddhist doctrine that in order to start on the path to enlightenment, one’s basic needs for food, shelter and health have to be covered. Moral excellence isn’t a right but a privilege.
The point is that biological evolution and spiritual progress are simply not the same thing. In fact they could be said to be at odds with each other. From a strictly naturalist viewpoint, we’d have to say that the most “evolved” people in the current sociopolitical system—the ones who will most successfully pass on their genes—are those who can best adapt to it and manipulate it to their advantage. These aren’t the people calling for change but those who profit from the status quo. There’s no place for the “wretched of the earth,” for heroes, saints, mystics and poets, in a purely evolutionary framework. Spiritual progress depends precisely on overcoming the tyranny of reflex and unconscious instinct. Getting back to semantics, perhaps what we need isn’t evolution at all but anti-evolution, counter-evolution, or just a plain revolution in the way we live with one another.
In my view, Terrence Malick gets to the heart of it in Tree of Life with his dichotomy of nature and grace. Evolution is nature’s game. But there’s another power at work in the universe, namely grace, which doesn’t evolve. It was there from the start, waiting perhaps for the emergence of a mind capable of entering into it. Through grace, the mind transcends itself and, in so doing, transfigures nature by revealing its terrible beauty. Humans have this unique capacity to get beyond the blind mechanics of nature through acts of creative love, what the Greeks called agape. This capacity didn’t evolve; it emerged from the mystery of consciousness, itself a gift that came to us from God knows where.
Agape isn’t the privilege of this or that social class, this or that tribe, this or that creed or colour-coded meme. We don’t become heroic by joining the clique that already claims to be enlightened. We become heroic by doing the right thing, by giving ourselves over to something that exceeds the biological imperative. This can’t happen in a group—it can only happen in individuals. The natural response to all of this, of course, is despair, because how could we expect everyone to individually choose to do what’s most difficult at the critical moment? As I see it, we have no option but to believe in the possibility, however remote, of an event—an apocalypse, literally a “lifting of the veil”—that will offer each of us the opportunity to make the leap. Given what’s going on in the world, it’s getting harder and harder for the skeptics to laugh off the predictions about 2012. The hour’s getting late. It may be possible that the Event is upon us, and that enough of us will heed its call to change the world through love.
The Limits of Control
Gilles Deleuze’s “Postscript on the Societies of Control” may well be one of the most prescient pieces of writing of the last quarter century, and one that’s particularly relevant now. In it, the French philosopher maps out the new system he saw replacing the “disciplinary societies” that had held sway in the West since the time of Napoleon.
Disciplinary society rested on the establishment of “spaces of enclosure” for containing and managing masses of people. Its paragon of organization was the prison. As Foucault argued in Discipline and Punish, the prison served as the model for the design of everything else in disciplinary societies: hospitals, schools, factories. The individual moved from one closed environment to another in a hermetic circuit that took him from birth to death. With each transition, he had to learn the rules of a new environment, even though the rules everywhere boiled down to the same message: get in line, know your place, follow along.
The society of discipline started declining after World War II. By the time Deleuze wrote the Postscript in 1989, it was tearing at the seams. Deleuze saw that the activities formally confined to “spaces of enclosure” were now breaking out of their traditional boundaries and a new system was taking shape. Drawing on William S. Burroughs, whose penetrating insights into the machinery of modern power make Naked Lunch the prophetic book of our times, Deleuze called the new form of organization the society of control. As evidence, he cited the rise of homecare to fuse the hospital with the home and the arrival of continuing education to create endless cycles of professional training. More importantly, he noted the replacement of the factory as the basic unit of capitalist activity with the corporation.
The factory was a solid structure where workers could be grouped, watched and disciplined under a central authority. The corporation, on the other hand, is not a solid but “a gas.” Unbounded in physical space, it can shrink or grow according to the needs of the moment. Its substance is numerical, ghostly. Its persona is its brand, transmuted via the sorcery of marking into a kind of “soul.” “[T]hat corporations have a soul,” Deleuze writes, “is the most terrifying news in the world.” True to its decentralized and decentralizing nature, the corporation’s attitude towards employees aims not at grouping them in a mass but at dividing them, at creating zones of eternal competition stitched together with bright white smiles and firm handshakes. By keeping employees in a permanent state of lack—in constant need of one more step up the ladder, one more raise, one more promotion, one more “team-building” activity—the corporation turns individuals into dividuals, or dividends. In exiting the disciplinary society, Deleuze writes, “man imprisoned has become man indebted.”
In the society of control, order doesn’t depend on punishing transgressors so much as limiting the possibilities of thought and thereby making transgression literally unthinkable. Slavoj Zizek, in his October 9th speech at OWS, mentioned the Chinese government’s recent prohibition of science fiction, fantasy and all works depicting alternate realities. This is good news, Zizek said, because it means that the Chinese can still dream of another world. Here in the West, speculative fiction poses no threat at all because, as a society, we have lost the ability to dream: “We lack the very language to articulate our unfreedom.” In other words, you can express any view you want because your views don’t matter. Think of The Matrix. There was a time when the theme of that film—the world is a cosmic prison—was a provocative thesis. But with the movie this wisdom turned into a Hollywood cliché. When Gnosticism is hip, you know it’s lost its heretical edge. It isn’t so much that the idea has lost its truth, but that the mechanisms of control relativize “truth” itself by turning all ideas into personal opinions.
The society of control is all around us: in the surveillance state, in the omnipresence of manipulative marketing, in the illusion of community via social media, in the proliferation of “non lethal” weapons, in the ubiquity of psychotropic drugs, in “pre-emptive” surgery, in the abolition of habeas corpus in the U.S. and its virtual disappearance elsewhere in the West, and so on. We have crossed into a never-land of double talk, delusion and soul-crushing relativism. “They” are not the only ones to blame; much of this, we’ve done to ourselves. In fact, even in our efforts to resist our language and thought patterns tend to perpetuate the same logic of control.
To put it plainly, until we can see in truth, beauty, justice and love more than flaccid clichés from a simpler time, control will reign unchallenged. Which is why the Occupy movement, fragile as it is at this early stage, gives cause for hope.
At the end of the Postscript, Deleuze addresses those who will have to resist the society of control as he and allies resisted the society of discipline. The old methods, he says, will not work. Strikes and marches will only go so far:
“The old monetary mole [Marx's image for the revolutionary worker] is the animal of the space of enclosure, but the serpent is that of the societies of control. We have passed from one animal to the other, from the mole to the serpent, in the system under which we live, but also in our manner of living and in our relations with others. The disciplinary man was a discontinuous producer of energy, but the man of control is undulatory, in orbit, in a continuous network. Everywhere surfing has already replaced the older sports.”
New problems require new solutions: the resisters on Wall Street know this well and are actively defining them. We appear to be transcending the Coke-or-Pepsi illusion of the Left and the Right. The protest has reshaped itself as an intentional community, a living alternative to the formula we’ve all been told is the only option. As Douglas Rushkoff makes clear in his shrewd column on the CNN website, Occupy Wall Street isn’t a gesture of resistance so much as an act of creation.
Read the “Postscript on the Societies of Control” here.



